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Divisible Copyright Under the
Copyright Act of 1976: The Effect
on Registration, Recordation,
Notice, and Standing to Suet
L INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act of 19761 explicitly recognizes that ownership
of the numerous exclusive rights comprising the copyright is divis-
ible.2 In so doing, Congress at long last laid to rest the remnants
of the doctrine of indivisible copyright which had been the source
of unnecessary complexity in the transfers of rights granted under
copyright law.
When the value of a copyright was centered on the right to pub-
lish, a doctrine which required unity of ownership was consistent
with commercial practices and needs. Since usually only one per-
son dealt with a copyrighted work, it was logical to transfer the
copyright as a whole.3 But with the advance of technology and
particularly the development of the motion picture and broadcast-
ing industries, the various rights comprising the copyright attained
independent importance.4 The notion of unity of ownership con-
tradicted the nature of copyright, which encompasses an aggregate
t This essay was awarded first prize in the 1978 Nathan Burkan Memorial Com-
petition at the University of Nebraska College of Law, and is entered in the
National Competition, which is sponsored by the American Society of Com-
posers, Authors, and Publishers.
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-809 (1976).
2. Id. § 201(d).
3. CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INsTrruTE, OMNIBus COPYRIGHT REVISION 107 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as OmNmus COPYRIGHT REVISION].
4. The exclusive rights in copyrighted works enumerated in the Copyright Act
of 1909, included the rights to reprint, copy, publish, translate, dramatize, ar-
range, adapt, and perform publicly for profit Copyright Act, ch. 320,35 Stat.
1075 (1909).
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that the copyright owner has the exclu-
sive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works, to
distribute copies of the copyrighted work, and to perform and display the
copyrighted work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
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of rights, and caused a great deal of confusion in the marketing of
an author's product. Thus, the doctrine of indivisibility was greatly
criticized and most commentators agreed that "[t] he doctrine of
indivisibility of copyright is an anachronism and outmoded fiction;
it ignores the business and commercial practices in the copyright
field."5 Nevertheless, at least theoretically, it survived until the re-
cent statutory revision.
This comment will discuss the recognition of divisible copyright
in the Copyright Act of 1976. It will focus primarily on the effects
of the statutory recognition of divisibility on those provisions of
the Copyright Act of 1976 which deal with the problems of registra-
tion, recordation, notice and standing to sue for infringement.
II. THE "SO-CALLED" DOCTRINE OF INDIVISIBLE
COPYRIGHT
Initially, it is necessary to discuss briefly the doctrine of indi-
visible copyright. Theoretically, the doctrine of indivisibility re-
quired a "unity of ownership of legal title to the entire bundle" of
rights labeled as copyright.6 Consistent with this theory, the legal
rights incident to ownership of the copyright could only be trans-
ferred by assigning all of the rights in a particular work. A trans-
fer of anything less than all of the exclusive rights comprising the
copyright constituted a license, which permitted the transferee to
use the work but did not entitle him to any of the rights of owner-
ship.7 Thus in its extreme form, the doctrine of indivisibility oper-
ated to categorize transfers of rights comprising copyright as
either assignments or licenses, the distinction turning on whether
the transfer included the totality of rights.8
5. H. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION RIGHTS § 53, at 134 (1953).
6. Schulman, Author's Rights, in COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS ANALYZED 19, 22 (1966).
In summarizing the theory of indivisible copyright, it has been stated:
With respect to a particular work embodied in concrete form, or
separable part of such work, there is, at any one time, in any particu-
lar jurisdiction, only a single incorporeal legal title or property
known as the copyright, which encompasses all of the authorial
rights recognized by the law of the particular jurisdiction with re-
spect thereto.
Henn, "Magazine Rights"--A Division of Indivisible Copyright, 40 CoRNELL
LQ. 411, 417-18 (1955).
7. See, e.g., Field v. True Comics, 89 F. Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Eliot v.
Geare-Marston, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 301, 306 (ED. Pa. 1939); M. Witmark & Sons v.
Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470,474 (E.D.S.C. 1924), affd, 2 F.2d 1020 (4th
Cir. 1924). See also 2 M. Nnmam=, COPYRIGHT § 119.1, at 510-11 (citing Gold-
wyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1922), cert.
denied, 62 U.S. 755 (1923); New Fiction Publishing Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994,
996 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)); OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION, supra note 3, at 107; B.
RINGER & P. GrrLER, COPYRIGHTS, 53 (1965).
8. B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 307 (1978). This interpretation
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The concept of an indivisible copyright is a judicial creation 9
which developed rather obscurely in case law.10 Although the
Copyright Act of 1909"1 did not expressly state that ownership
of copyright is indivisible, it has been stated that this concept
was implied in the Act since the constant statutory references to
"the copyright proprietor"' 2 logically implied singular ownership. 3
Whether this analysis is accurate as a matter of statutory construc-
of the doctrine of indivisibility precluded assignments limited as to duration,
geographic area, or parts of the total collection of exclusive rights comprising
the copyright. See A. Wi.L, A~mEncAN COPYRIGHT LAw § 151, at 545 (1917);
Kaminstein, Divisibility of Copyrights, Study No. 14 in 1 STuDiES ON COPY-
RiGTr 623, 635 (A. Fisher mem. ed. 1963).
9. Kaminstein, supra note 8, at 635.
10. The development of the doctrine of indivisible copyright has been traced by
various commentators from two different origins. It has been said that the
doctrine is derived from patent law, see H. WARNER, supra note 5, § 53, at 130,
and, perhaps more accurately, that it developed through a misapplication of
two early patent cases decided by the Supreme Court on procedural grounds.
Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 309,419 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing).'
In Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477 (1850), the Supreme Court held
that an assignment for a specified territory which does not convey the entire
and unqualified monopoly held by the patentee is a mere license, which is
legally binding between the parties, but which does not vest legal title in the
licensee and does not give the licensee standing to sue a third party for in-
fringement. As an explanation for its holding, the Court stated that to allow
the creation of several monopolies would
inevitably lead to fraudulent impositions upon persons who desired
to purchase the use of the improvement, and would subject a party
who, under a mistake as to his rights, used the invention without au-
thority, to be harassed by a multiplicity of suits instead of one, and to
successive recoveries of damages by different persons holding differ-
ent portions of the patent right in the same place.
Id. at 494-95.
A later case, Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1890), utilized the ra-
tionale of Gayler, and held that an agreement, by which the patentee granted
the exclusive right to manufacture and sell but not to use the patented article
throughout the United States was a license and the licensee could not main-
tain a suit against a third party for infringement of the patent.
The origin of the doctrine of indivisibility has also been traced by com-
mentators to an English case, Jefferys v. Boosey, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (H.L. 1854),
which dealt with a transfer of copyright. The transfer involved the exclusive
right to publish the work in the United Kingdon. At least one of the opinions
expressed )was that copyright cannot be partially assigned and therefore the
transfer was a mere license. Id. at 730. See Kaminstein, supra note 8, at
626-27; Note, Copyright-The Doctrine of Indivisibility: The Final Chapter, 7
MEmpns ST. L REV. 637, 638-41 (1977). But see H. WARNER, supra note 5, § 53,
at 132 n.11 (cases collected therein do not follow the notion of indivisibility
articulated in Jefferys v. Boosey, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (HI. 1854)).
11. Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
12. See id. §§ 1-3, 7-12, 14, 19, 21-22, 24-26, 28, 42, 62.
13. OmiBus COPYRIGHT REVISION, supra note 3, at 107; Henn, supra note 6, at
416. The Copyright Act of 1909 equated the label of the copyright proprietor
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tion may be questioned; however, it is clear that the statute distin-
guished between an assignee, who is the copyright proprietor, and
a mere licensee.1 4 The superimposing of the judicially created
doctrine of indivisible copyright onto the statutory scheme led to
the conclusion that only an assignee who is granted the entire bun-
dle of rights comprising the copyright could be the owner or "the
copyright proprietor."
It was the author or "the copyright proprietor" who secured
copyright by publication of the work with notice;15 who could ob-
tain registration of his or her claim;16 whose name was required to
appear in the notice;17 whose signature was required on an instru-
ment granting, assigning, or mortgaging the copyright;18 and who
was entitled to damages, profits, or statutory damages due to in-
fringement,' 9 etc. 20 Thus, the distinction between a transfer of all
the exclusive rights incident to copyright and a lesser transfer had
a significant legal effect, at least theoretically.
21
The notion of indivisibility is diametrically opposed to commer-
cial practices.22 The exclusive rights in a copyright are generally
useful in many different fields and a single owner frequently can-
not develop the rights in all potential areas. Thus, it is often less
profitable for an author to transfer all of the rights to one grantee.
23
Necessity encouraged commercial practioners to contractually
avoid some of the problems caused by the concept of indivisibil-
ity.2 4
with the word owner. Copyright Act, ch. 320, §§ 1, 2, 8, 9, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
See also Henn, supra note 6, at 416 n.18.
14. Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 8, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
15. Id. §§ 8-9.
16. Id. § 10.
17. Id. § 18.
18. Id. § 42.
19. Id. § 25.
20. The copyright proprietor also renewed the copyright, id. § 23; granted author-
ization for the first edition of the work, id. § 62; consented to production of a
copyrightable new version, id. § 6; paid a fine, if required, for failure to de-
posit copies, id. § 13; reimbursed an innocent infringer, as required under
some circumstances, id. § 20; and had several obligations under some com-
pulsory licensing provisions, id. § l(e). See Henn, supra note 6, at 417.
21. At one time the doctrine of indivisible copyright also had important tax con-
sequences. The characterization of a transfer as an assignment or a license
played an important role in determining whether the income should be taxed
as capital gain or ordinary income. If a transfer was an assignment, it could
be considered a sale of a capital asset which was obviously an advantage to
the copyright owner. See 2 M. NIxmER, supra note 7, § 119.2, at 516 n.33; Mar-
golis, Divisibility in Relation to Income Tax, Supplement No. 1, Study No. 11,
in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 663 (A. Fisher mem. ed. 1963).
22. See note 5 & accompanying text supra.
23. Henn, supra note 6, at 432; Kaminstein, supra note 8, at 636.
24. A Wasserstrom, Magazine Newspaper and Syndicated Problems, in CoPY-
DIVISIBLE COPYRIGHT
Judicial application of the doctrine of indivisibility could result
in harsh consequences, such as forfeiture of the copyright, thus
causing the work to fall into the public domain,25 or the inability of
a party to bring a suit for infringement.2 6 The reluctance of
courts 27 to render such decisions encouraged the articulation of
other less extreme tests to distinguish between an assignee and a
licensee.28 Some courts concluded that copyright was divisible as
to duration or geographic area, apparently reasoning that the indi-
visibility concept was aimed primarily at preventing the severance
of certain rights from the rest of the bundle of rights.29 Equitable
doctrines were applied in other cases to reach the desired re-
sults.30 Some courts simply rejected the application of the doc-
RIGHT PROBLEMS ANALYZED 159, 168 (1966); Note, supra note 10, at 648. See
generally Henn, supra note 6. For example, if the transferor of the copyright
wished to retain certain limited rights but also wanted to ensure that the
transferee obtained "proprietor" status, it was suggested that they enter into
a two-step agreement. The transferor assigned the totality of rights in the
copyright to the transferee, who then transferred the limited rights back to
the transferor. 2 M. Nnmix, supra note 7, § 119.31, at 516.
Other commentators have suggested that persons dealing with literary
and artistic works simply ignored the doctrine of indivisibility and hoped
"fervently that the other fellow was honest." Appleman, Compromise in
Copyright, 19 B.U. L. Rev. 619, 624 (1939).
25. This result could occur when the work was published and the notice attached
thereto was in the name of a licensee rather than the copyright proprietor.
See notes 150-55 & accompanying text infra.
26. A licensee could not sue a third party for infringement unless he joined the
copyright proprietor as a party. See notes 182-84 & accompanying text infra.
27. It has been asserted that commentators extended the doctrine of indivisibil-
ity much further than did the courts. 24 S.W.LJ. 711 (1970).
28. Some courts and writers suggested that if the transfer included all the rights
designated in one of the five statutory categories of exclusive rights it was an
assignment. Another standard permitted a transfer to be categorized as an
assignment if it comprised all of the rights necessary to produce a new ver-
sion which was itself copyrightable. A third test turned on the intent of the
parties to determine whether the transfer was an assignment or license. See
generally 2 1VL NnwmR, supra note 7, § 119.2, at 514 (and cases cited therein);
Henn, supra note 6, at 431-34 (and cases cited therein); Kaminstein, supra
note 8, at 636-39 (and cases cited therein); Neu, The Rights of a Copyright
Owner, 17 NoTRE DAME LAw. 373, 389-91 (1942).
As is not infrequent in this characterization approach, the judicial analy-
sis of a particular conveyance had a "question begging" quality. Often the
result was determined and then the transfer characterized accordingly. B.
KAPLAN & R. BROWA, supra note 8, at 307.
29. 2 U. Nmn=R, supra note 7, § 119.2, at 512-13, (and cases cited therein); Kamin-
stein, supra note 8, at 635-36 (and cases cited therein); Neu, supra note 28, at
388-89 (and cases cited therein).
30. To avoid holding that a work had fallen into the public domain in situations in
which a licensee had attempted to secure the copyright, some courts inferred
that the copyright was secured in trust for the copyright proprietor. See R.
NoRDHAus, PATNT TRADEmARK AND CoPYRGlrH INFmINGEMENT § 63, at 127
(1971) (and cases cited therein). The trust relationship was found to exist
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trine of indivisibility.3 ' Thus to say that the legal effect of the
doctrine was unclear is an understatement.32
While the judiciary was involved in rewriting or ignoring the
doctrine of indivisibility, its demise was also being sought in the
legislative branch.33 In fact, soon after the passage of the 1909
Act,3 4 attempts to secure divisibility by legislation became the
most important goal of authors and motion picture producers in
the copyright area.3 These legislative attempts at revision were
largely unsuccessful until 1976.36
when the proprietor requested the licensee to secure the copyright or even
when it could be implied from the circumstances. See 24 S.W.L.J. 711, 714
(1970) (and cases cited therein). The apparent rationale utilized to avoid re-
jecting the concept of indivisibility was based on the strained interpretation
or fiction that the licensee had been transferred the totality of rights for the
purpose of securing the copyright which was held in trust for the benefit of
the author or the copyright proprietor. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 119.2, at
519 (and cases cited therein).
Procedural problems arising from the licensee's inability to bring a suit for
infringement were limited by compelling the copyright proprietor, as trustee,
to join the suit. L.C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1936).
"Equity will not permit a wrong to remain unrighted if there is any possible
way to remedy the situation." Ilyin v. Avon Publications, 144 F. Supp. 368, 374
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
31. Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970) (rejecting
the application of the doctrine of indivisibility to avoid forfeiture of the copy-
right for failure to secure notice in the name of the copyright proprietor). See
also 2 M. NInMER, supra note 7, § 119.31, at 515 (and cases cited therein).
32. 24 S.W.L.J. 711, 712 (1970).
33. Kaminstein, supra note 8, at 633-34, app. at 655-61.
34. In 1910, the decision rendered in Dam v. Kirke La Shelie Co., 166 F. 589
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), affd, 175 F. 902 (2d Cir. 1910), caused a great deal of con-
cern, particularly among authors. The plaintiff sold his story to a magazine.
The transaction was evidenced only by a receipt accompanying the check
which indicated that it was "in full payment for story." The story was pub-
lished without a separate copyright notice. There was, however, a notice for
the entire magazine in the name of the publisher. The magazine purportedly
conveyed back to the plaintiff all of its interest in the copyrighted story. The
defendant, who used the story as the basis for a play, contended that the
magazine was a mere licensee because the initial transfer involved only the
first publication rights and that since the notice was, therefore, in the name
of a licensee rather than the copyright proprietor, it was of no effect and the
work had fallen into the public domain. The court construed the facts to hold
that the initial transfer involved the totality of rights in the work so that the
magazine was an assignee and thus copyright protection had been secured by
the notice. In dictum, the court indicated that if the author has reserved cer-
tain rights in the work, a separate notice in the author's name would be nec-
essary to secure copyright protection. The case indicated the hazards
awaiting the unwary due at least in part to the doctrine of indivisibility.
35. Kaminstein, supra note 8, at 629.
36. Id. at 633-34, app. at 655-61. It has been stated rather graphically that copy-
right revision in general is difficult because of the sharp conflict of interests
between highly organized groups. "[Copyright revision].., arouses as
DIVISIBLE COPYRIGHT
III. DIVISIBLE COPYRIGHT
Although commercial practice and judicial modification had
surmounted most of the difficulties caused by the notion of indivis-
ible copyright, so that in actuality an exclusive licensee stood in a
position which was similar to that of an assignee, most commenta-
tors considered it desirable to statutorily abolish the doctrine of
indivisibility.37 However, there was disagreement as to the extent
to which copyright should be divisible.38
One opinion was that copyright should be completely divisible,
so that the transfer of any exclusive right, regardless of limitations
as to the duration, the geographic area, or the scope of the exclu-
sive right, conveyed incidents of ownership to the transferee.3 9
For example, an author of a particular story could transfer sepa-
rately the exclusive right to publish it in a magazine, in hard bound
form, in paperback form or to use the -work as the basis for a movie,
television movie, series, musical, opera, play, pantomime, etc., and
each transferee of an exclusive right would be a copyright owner.
In contrast, the opinion existed that total divisibility could re-
sult in over-fragmentization of the rights to any one work.40 This
viewpoint stemmed from a fear that total divisibility would render
it too difficult to trace the title to a particular right or too expensive
to obtain permission from numerous owners and thus potential
users would be discouraged from using a particular work. It was
also feared that the usage of copyrighted works would decrease if
there were numerous copyright owners since any one such owner
could prohibit a prospective use.4 1 These concerns led to the sug-
much emotional heat as a coal strike. Everyone gets angry and little gets
done." Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503,
517 (1945). The major controversies were rooted in the conflicting interests
of authors and publishers versus the various groups of users of works, such
as broadcasters, motion picture producers, and record manufacturers. See
Goldman, The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954,
Study No. 1, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1101 (A. Fisher mem. ed. 1963).
Members of the copyright bar treated the notion of indivisibility as an
anachronism and generally disregarded it except for procedural purposes.
Kaminstein, supra note 8, at 641. Judicial modification of the doctrine un-
doubtedly decreased the impetus for statutory revision.
37. Kaminstein, supra note 8, at 649.
38. DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 88TH
CONG., IsT SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PT. 2, 162-69 (Comm. Print 1963)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT OF REGISTER, PT. 2]; Kaminstein, supra note 8,
at 651.
39. REPORT OF REGISTER, Pr. 2, supra note 38, at 162-69; PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR
REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE
DRAFT, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PT. 3, 402 (Comm.
Print 1964) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
40. REPORT OF REGISTER, Pr. 2, supra note 38, at 164.
41. Id. at 166.
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gestion that the statute enumerate specific exclusive rights which
are capable of being assigned.42 Another suggestion was that a
transfer, in order to be considered an assignment with all of the
incidents of copyright ownership, should convey all exclusive
rights within any separately recognized medium of exploitation.43
Both suggestions offered as a method of limiting divisibility
were rejected 44 The Copyright Act of 1976 adopted the counter-
vailing argument that such limitations were artificial and would
continue to unduly restrict exploitation of a work.45 Statutory
enumeration of rights which could be separately assigned was crit-
icized because in an era of developing technology such specificity
could render the revised statute obsolete in a short period of
time.4 The proposal to categorize assignments based on the stan-
dard of a recognized medium of exploitation was criticized as be-
ing too vague to allow transferees to be certain of their status and
the nature of the rights they purchased.47
The Copyright Act of 1976 does not limit the extent to which
ownership of any exclusive rights may be sub-divided and trans-
ferred. Section 201(d) (2) provides:
Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any
subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be trans-
ferred as provided by clause (1) 1481 and owned separately. The owner of
any particular exclusive right is entitled to the extent of that right, to all of
the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this ti-
tle.4 9
By specifically mentioning subdivisions of the exclusive rights
enumerated in section 106, section 201(d) (2) clarifies the defini-
tions of "copyright owner" and a "transfer of copyright ownership"
found in section 101, which provides in pertinent part:
"Copyright owner," with respect to any one of the exclusive rights com-
prised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right.
42. Id. See also Comment, Indivisibility of Copyright-An Obsolete Doctrine,
37 U. COLO. L REV. 95, 103-04 (1964). This is the approach taken by the En-
glish copyright statute. Kaminstein, supra note 8, at 651 (citing Copyright
Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2 c.74 § 2).
43. REPORT OF REGISTER, PT. 2, supra note 38, at 167-69.
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1976).
45. OMNmus COPYRIGHT REVISION, supra note 3, at 109.
46. Id.; REPORT OF REGISTER, Pr. 2, supra note 38, at 168.
47. REPORT OF REGISTER, Pr. 2, supra note 38, at 167.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1) (1976) provides: "The ownership of a copyright may be
transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of
law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the ap-
plicable laws of intestate succession." To be valid, a transfer of copyright
ownership, unless it is by operation of law, must be in writing and signed by
the owner of the rights conveyed or by such owner's authorized agent. Id. §
204(a).
49. Id. § 201(d)(2).
DIVISIBLE COPYRIGHT
A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, mortgage, exclu-
sive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a
copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in the copyright,
whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
non-exclusive license.
50
The Copyright Act of 1976 abolishes the need to characterize a
transfer as an assignment or a license for the purpose of determin-
ing ownership of the copyright. However, the Act provides for a
classification that rests on distinctions between exclusive and non-
exclusive rights. A person with a non-exclusive right to use a par-
ticular work, i.e., a non-exclusive licensee, does not have any
rights of ownership. The importance of this distinction will be fur-
ther discussed in regard to specific statutory provisions.
In recognizing the divisibility of the bundle of exclusive rights
comprising the copyright, the Copyright Act of 1976 clarifies the
confusion which resulted because of the divorce of legal doctrines
from commercial reality. But discarding the doctrine of indivisi-
bility does not resolve the problems which initially brought about
the need for the rule.5 ' The need to determine who owns the
copyright in a work and the desire to prevent multiplicity of suits
and recoveries for infringement are considerations which are
equally important today. It is obviously much easier to trace title
and prevent multiplicity of suits when the copyright is controlled
by a single proprietor.52 Thus legal recognition of divisibility re-
quired adjustments in the statutory framework. The remainder of
this comment will explore some of the changes made by the Copy-
right Act of 1976 in order to accommodate the statutory recognition
of divisibility. Specifically, the following discussion will focus on
the provisions dealing with registration, recordation of transfers,
notice of copyright and the right to sue for infringement.
A. Registration
The system of registration serves several important functions
which are of value both to copyright owners and potential users 5 3
50. Id. § 101.
51. Kaminstein, supra note 8, at 650.
52. Id.
53. A public registration system provides an administrative review of copyright
claims which weeds out those claims which are totally unfounded and
thereby avoids needless litigation and promotes the use of material which
prospective users may otherwise presume to be protected. Administrative
review of applications for registrations also informs authors and other claim-
ants of the requirements for copyright protection.
Registration provides potential users information concerning ownership
of the copyright. It also provides copyright owners a permanent record of
their claims. The certificate of registration may be considered as prima facie
1041
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The role of the registration process is to add to the information
available to the public concerning works claiming copyright pro-
tection. Registration, combined with the deposit of copies54 and,
more importantly, the recordation of transfers,5 5 comprises the
public body of information which enables prospective users to
trace the title of the copyright.
Because of the intangible nature of copyright, the public record
system in the copyright office may be of even greater importance
to prospective users than systems of tracing title to other forms of
property.5 6 And to the extent that the registration system instills
confidence in the title and validity of rights in the copyright which
are transferred, it is also of value to owners as it promotes market-
ability.5 7 The information on a few classes of works may also be
of value to prospective users looking for suitable material as a
method of discovering what is not protected by copyright.58
Of course, the value of the registration system depends on its
reliability in revealing the ownership and the interest at any given
time. The system of registration has been criticized on several
grounds as being unreliable5 9 During the revision process, most
interested groups favored a public registration system which
would provide the most complete and reliable record possible,
without imposing forfeiture of copyright as the penalty for failure
evidence in judicial proceedings of the validity of the copyright and of the
facts stated in the certificate. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1976).
See also Kaplan, The Registration of Copyright, Study No. 17, in 1 STuDIEs
ON COPYRIGHT 325, 367-68 (A. Fisher mem. ed. 1963); REPORT OF THE REGISTER
OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAws, 87TH
CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REvISION 72-73 (Comm. Print 1961) [herein-
after cited as REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS].
54. Subject to administrative regulations as to certain types of works, two copies
of the best edition of a published work or one complete copy of an unpub-
lished work are required to accompany the application for registration. How-
ever, the deposit of copies need not accompany registration if copies are
deposited with the Library of Congress according to the provisions of section
407. 17 U.S.C. § 408(b), (c) (1976). The purpose of the deposit requirement is
to identify the work being registered and to increase the collections in the
Library of Congress. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, .supra note
53, at 77.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1976).
56. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 370.
57. Id. at 368.
58. Id. at 369.
59. Administrative review of claims presented for application is incomplete.
Claims which are erroneously registered possess an unwarranted presump-
tion of validity and may prevent legitimate use of the work by others. Errors
in the initial registration may cause the entire record of that work to be
faulty. It is also said that registration may not clearly identify that portion of
the work which is copyrighted or the work from which the copyrighted work
was derived. Id. at 367-70.
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to register.60 This was the approach adopted in the Copyright
Act of 1976.61
Registration is not a condition of copyright;62 however, it is a
condition for copyright protection. 63 An action for copyright in-
fringement cannot be instituted until registration has occurred.64
Several inducements for prompt registration have been added to
the statutory scheme.65 A work must be registered in order for a
recorded document pertaining to the copyright to give constructive
notice.6 6 Recovery of both statutory damages and attorney's fees
is precluded for infringements which occur prior to registration of
either unpublished or published works although, for the latter,
there is a three month grace period after publication.67 Thus it is
to the owner's benefit to register promptly.68
The statutorily recognized divisibility of copyright raises sev-
eral issues involving the system of registration. Section 408(a)
provides that the owner of any exclusive right in the work may ob-
tain registration of the copyright claim.69 It is unclear from the
language of the statute itself what effect registration of a work by
an owner has on the rights of other owners in the same work.
The Copyright Office has adopted the position that it will gener-
ally not accept more than one basic registration for the same
60. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 53, at 73.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1976).
62. Id. The only circumstance in which failure to register may result in invali-
dating the copyright occurs when the copyright notice has been omitted from
a publicly distributed work. Id. § 405(a).
63. Levine & Squires, Notice, Deposit and Registration," The Importance of Being
Formal, 24 U.C.L.A L. REV. 1232, 1262 (1977).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1976). "Without the right of vindication a copyright is
valueless." Washington Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 40 (1939).
65. 17 U.S.C. §§ 205(c) (2), 412 (1976).
66. Id. § 205(c) (2). See note 104 & accompanying text infra.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1976). The copyright owner may elect to recover statutory
damages in lieu of actual damages and other profits. The minimum and maxi-
mum limits of recovery for statutory damages vary depending on whether the
infringement was willful or committed without reason to believe that the use
was an infringement. Id. § 504(c) (1) (2).
68. Also, in order for the certificate of registration to constitute prima facie evi-
dence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts contained in the certifi-
cate, registration must occur within five years after the first publication of the
work. Id. § 410(c) (1976).
69. Id. § 408(a), provides:
At any time during the subsistence of copyright in any published
or unpublished work, the owner of copyright or of any exclusive right
in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim by deliver-
ing to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, to-
gether with the application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708.
Subject to the provisions of section 405(a), such registration is not a
condition of copyright protection.
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work.7 0 The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 indi-
cates that there is a "general rule against allowing more than one
registration for the same work."71 This is supported by section
408(e) which specifically allows an additional registration for the
first published work even though an unpublished edition of the
same work was previously registered.72 In reaching its conclusion,
the Copyright Office also argued that multiple basic registrations
would complicate and confuse the public record,7 3 thus imposing
upon the public greater costs and obligations in attempting to trace
ownership of a work.
Thus the Copyright Office concluded that a basic registration
made by any one owner is sufficient to obtain the benefits of regis-
tration for all owners of rights in the work.7 4 Specifically, a basic
registration by the author or a copyright owner is sufficient to per-
mit any other copyright owner to instigate an action for infringe-
ment regardless of whether or not that owner's name appears in
the registration.7 5 Similarly, a 'timely registration within three
months after the first publication of the work by the author or an
owner suffices to allow recovery of statutory damages and attor-
ney's fees by any other owner who sues for infringement.7 6 In addi-
tion, registration by the author or any owner will satisfy the
requirement for all other owners that a work be registered in order
for a recorded document of transfer to constitute constructive no-
tice.77
70. 43 Fed. Reg. 965, 967 (1978) (interim regulation, to be codified in 37 C.F.R. §
202.3(b) (6)). A "basic registration" in this context is defined as "a registra-
tion made on application under section 408(a)." 42 Fed. Reg. 48,944 (1977).
71. M-R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 155, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5771; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1975).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 408(e) (1976). This is the context in which the legislative history
indicates that the general rule is against allowing multiple registrations.
HLIR REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 155, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5771; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1975).
73. 43 Fed. Reg. 965 (1978); 42 Fed. Reg. 48,944, 48,945 (1977).
74. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,944, 48,945-46 (1977). While any owner may file an initial basic
registration, it must include the name of the copyright "claimant," as defined
by regulation. See notes 92-93 & accompanying text infra.
75. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1976). Under id. § 205(d), a person who has acquired
his ownership of the copyright, or one of the exclusive rights thereof by a
transfer may not bring an infringement suit until the document evidencing
the transfer has been recorded.
76. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,944,48,946 (1977); 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1976). To require registration
in the name of each owner of an exclusive right, in order for such an owner to
be entitled to statutory damages and attorney's fees, would render the three
month grace period meaningless. Further, it would preclude awarding such
a recovery in some instances to a particular owner who first uses the work
after the three month grace period. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,944, 48,946 (1977).
77. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,944, 48,946 (1977); 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (2) (1976). Since the docu-
ments of transfer which are recorded reveal the parties to the transaction,
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The Copyright Office has recognized several exceptions to the
rule that multiple basic registrations will not be allowed.7 8 If an
applicant for a basic registration contends that an earlier basic re-
gistration was unauthorized and invalid, the additional registration
will be accepted by the Copyright Office.7 9 This exception is
based on the notion that the Copyright Office should not resolve
the merits of such conflicts.8 0 Moreover, acceptance of the addi-
tional basic registration may put prospective users on notice of the
conflicting claims.8 '
Another exception to the general prohibition against multiple
registrations allows an author in certain circumstances to file a
second basic registration. 82 This exception applies when the au-
thor has transferred all rights to the copyrighted work or has trans-
ferred the contractual right to claim legal title to the copyright in
an application for registration and the transferee has registered
the work.83 The reason given for this exception involves the prob-
lem of tracing an author's retained interest through documents of
transfer.84 If the author is not identified as the copyright claimant
in the registration his or her interest may be difficult to ascer-
tain.85 Therefore, the author may register, but will not lose any of
there is no reason for requiring that the registration be in either of their
names. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,944, 48,946 (1977).
78. An exception is statutorily recognized in 17 U.S.C. § 408(e) (1976), which al-
lows registration for the first published edition of a work, even if the work in
an unpublished form was previously registered. 43 Fed. Reg. 964, 967 (1978)
(interim regulation, to be codified in 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b) (6) (i)).
79. 43 Fed. Reg. 964, 967 (1978) (interim regulation, to be codified in 37 C.F.R. §
202.3(b) (6) (iii)). Failure to file a second registration would not affect an
owner's right to the statutory benefits flowing from registration. 42 Fed. Reg.
48,944, 48,946 (1977).
80. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,944, 48,945 (1977).
81. Although this purpose could also be achieved by the use of a supplementary
registration, the supplementary registration is maintained as an independent
record which is separate from the earlier basic registration. HI.R REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 155, reprinted in [1976] U. S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5771.
82. 43 Fed. Reg. 965, 967 (1978) (interim regulation, to be codified in 37 C.F.R. §
202.3 (b) (6) (ii)).
83. These conditions are set forth in the definition of a copyright "claimant." 43
Fed Reg. 965, 966 (1978) (interim regulation, to be codified in 37 C.F.R. §
202.3(a)(3)). See notes 92-98 & accompanying text infra.
84. "Recordation of transfers of copyright ownership are essentially directed at
the transferee, not at the author from whom all rights derive... [T] hey are a
cumbersome, impractical and inappropriate way of making a public record of
an author's retained rights in a work." 42 Fed. Reg. 48,944, 48,945-46 (1977).
85. The author may retain. a royalty interest, an interest by virtue of an express
limitation in a transfer, or an interest by virtue of statutory termination of
transfers as provided in 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1976). Supplementary registration
may be inadequate to inform the public of the author's interest. See note 81
supra.
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the statutory benefits by failing to file a second registration.
8 6
Section 408(d) provides for the filing of applications for supple-
mentary registration "to correct an error in copyright registration
or to amplify the information given in a registration. '87 A supple-
mentary registration may be filed by the author or owner of an ex-
clusive right, but it has no effect on securing the statutory benefits
of registration. In particular, the supplementary registration does
not replace the necessity for recording the document evidencing a
transfer.8 8
The supplementary registration is an independent record
which is maintained separately from the basic registration.8 9 It is,
however, required to identify the basic registration which it cor-
rects or amplifies.90 "The information contained in the sup-
plementary registration augments but does not supercede that
contained in the earlier registration."91
Statutory recognition of divisibility also necessitates an adjust-
ment in the information required in the application. Section 409
sets out certain information which the application for registration
must include. 92 Section 409(1) requires that the application con-
tain the name and address of the "copyright claimant. '93 Section
409(5) requires that if the "copyright claimant" is not the author,
the application should include information concerning how the
claimant obtained ownership of the copyright. 94 The term "copy-
right claimant" is not statutorily defined. Some concern was ex-
pressed that if the claimant was equated with the owner who
applied for registration, it could misleadingly imply ownership of
the entire copyright. 95 The Copyright Office agreed with this ra-
tionale and reached the conclusion that allowing an applicant,
whose ownership could be limited to one exclusive right, to indi-
cate that he or she was the copyright claimant would result in an
inaccurate public record and thus "subvert the purpose of the re-
gistration system. '96 Under interim regulation section 202.3(a) (3)
86. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,944, 48,946 (1977).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 408(d) (1976).
88. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,944, 48,945 (1977).
89. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 155, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5771.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 408(d) (1976).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 409. Section 409(11) authorizes the Register of Copyrights to require
other information "bearing upon the preparation or identification of the work
or the existence, ownership or duration of the copyright." See 43 Fed. Reg.
965, 967 (1978) (interim regulation, to be codified in 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(c) (2)).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 409(1) (1976).
94. Id. § 409(5).
95. 43 Fed. Reg. 965 (1978).
96. Id. "We do not believe that the concept of 'divisibility of copyright' was in-
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"copyright claimant" is defined as either
i The author of a work, [or]
ii. A person or organization that has obtained ownership of all rights
under the copyright initially belonging to the author.
97
Category (ii) includes "a person or organization that has obtained,
from the author or from an entity that has obtained ownership of
all rights under the copyright initially belonging to the author, the
contractual right to claim legal title to the copyright in an applica-
tion for copyright registration. 9 8
Statutory recognition of divisible copyright has necessitated ad-
justments in the technicalities of the registration scheme, includ-
ing who may register the work, the effect of basic registration on
other owners, the nature and effect of the supplementary registra-
tion, and the content of the application for basic registration. Di-
visibility, which emphasizes the necessity of providing an accurate
public record of copyright ownership, also increases the impor-
tance of registration. This increased importance is reflected in the
statutory inducements to register. However, the registration proc-
ess focuses primarily on initial ownership and thus is only a part of
the scheme to provide the public with accurate and dependable
information to determine who owns the rights in the copyright of a
work. The recordation of transfers is an equally important
method of obtaining this goal.
B. Recordation of Transfers
Statutory recognition of divisibility in the Copyright Act of 1976
facilitates fragmented transfers of rights.99 In addition, technolog-
ical advances have increased, and probably will continue to in-
crease, the variety of ways in which a copyrighted work may be
used. As a result of these factors, commercial transactions involv-
ing transfers to copyright are increasingly complex.'00 Such com-
plexity, combined with the consideration that copyright is by
nature an intangible right which is incapable of physical posses-
sion, indicates the importance of an accurate and dependable body
of public information concerning copyrighted works.101
tended to allow the owner of an individual right or rights to claim, or appear
to claim, on our records, ownership of the entire copyright."
97. Id. at 966 (interim regulation, to be codified in 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(a) (3)).
98. Id.
99. See notes 48-50 & accompanying text supra. See also Latman, The Recorda-
tion of Copyright Assignments and Licenses, Study No. 19, in 1 STuDIEs ON
CoPyRIGHT 763 (A. Fisher mem. ed. 1963).
100. Latman, supra note 99, at 763.
101. Id.
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The role of registration in the system of providing public infor-
mation has already been discussed. However, registration usually
indicates only initial ownership of exclusive rights in a copyrighted
work. Because a copyrighted work can be exploited in such a
great variety of ways, the availability of information concerning in-
itial ownership may be of less importance than information re-
vealing the exclusive rights which have subsequently been
transferred to various owners. 102 The latter information is pro-
vided through the statutory scheme of recording documents which
evidence a transfer of rights in a copyright.
Of course, a complete system of information requires a combi-
nation of registration and recordation of transfers. This interrela-
tionship is recognized in the Copyright Act of 1976, which provides
in section 205(c) that in order for a recorded document to give con-
structive notice of its contents, the work involved must have been
registered. 103 The language of this provision raises some question
as to whether registration of a work must occur before recordation
of the document in order for the recorded document to ever consti-
tute constructive notice.1° 4 It has been suggested that the more
sensible interpretation of this provision is that a document gives
constructive notice when it is recorded and.the work is registered,
regardless of which occurs first. 05 On the other hand, it could be
argued that an earlier recorded document may never be linked to a
subsequent registration since the document will not reveal the reg-
istration number. Thus the recorded document may be easily
missed by persons searching the records.10 6 Moreover, since regis-
102. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 369 n.85, 383 (citing 86 CONG. REC. 77 (1940)).
103. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1976).
104. Id. § 205(c), provides in pertinent part-
Recordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all per-
sons constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document,
but only f-
(1) the document, or material attached to it, specifically identi-
fies the work to which it pertains so that, after the document is in-
dexed by the Register of Copyrights, it would be revealed by a
reasonable search under the title or registration number of the work-
and
(2) registration has been made for the work.
(emphasis added).
105. Kadden, Ownership, Transfer Termination and Notice, in PRACTCING UNDER
THE COPYRIGHT LAw OF 1976 at 9, 21 (Practising L. Inst. 1978).
106. A document which fails to meet the requirements of section 205(c) and,
therefore, does not give constructive notice may still be recorded. Section
205(a) articulates the requirement for recordation, which is simply that the
document bear the actual signature of the person who executed it, or that it
be accompanied by a sworn certification that it is a true copy of the original,
signed document. 17 U.S.C. § 205 (a) (1976). Thus it is possible, albeit un-
likely, for a recorded document to give actual notice, even though it is incapa-
ble of operating as constructive notice.
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tration may be obtained by any owner of an exclusive right, it does
not seem to place too great a burden on an owner to register the
work before or at the same time that he or she records a document
of transfer. 0 7
The increased importance of recordation of transfers in the
Copyright Act of 1976 is evidenced by the requirement that in or-
der to institute a suit for infringement, a plaintiff who claims own-
ership of any exclusive right in a copyrighted work on the basis of
a transfer of ownership must record the document which is the in-
strument of transfer.108 Although this provision makes recorda-
tion a condition of copyright enforcement, it is less stringent than
that dealing with registration.109 Recordation must occur prior to
the commencement of the suit, however, and in contrast to an un-
registered work, there is no limitation as to the type of recovery if
recordation is delayed."o The infringement suit may also involve
a cause of action that arose before recordation."'
The principal inducement to promptly record a document evi-
dencing a transfer of ownership is found in the provision for con-
structive notice. By establishing priorities among conflicting
transfers on the basis of recordation of documents, this aspect of
the statutory scheme offers substantial protection to owners. Al-
though the Copyright Act of 1909 established a similar recordation
system," 2 confusion existed as to the scope and effects of recorda-
tion. The provisions of section 205 of the Copyright Act of 1976 are
intended to clear up a number of uncertainties arising from the
prior act.ll 3
The Copyright Act of 1909 provided that an assignment must be
recorded within three months after its execution" 4 or it was void
as against a subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration with-
out notice who duly recorded the assignment." 5 The confusion
caused by this provision was due to the notion of indivisibility of
107. Because of the other statutory inducements incident to registration, the own-
er may want to be certain that the work has been promptly registered. See
notes 64-68 & accompanying text supra.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1976). The Copyright Act of 1909 did not include such a
provision. H.R REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5744-45.
109. 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1976). Compare id. §§ 411 to 412.
110. Id. § 205(d).
111. Id.
112. Copyright Act, ch. 320, §§ 44-45, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
113. HR. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 128, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5744.
114. Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 44, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (or within six months after its
excution outside of the United States).
115. Id.
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copyright with its distinction between assignments and licenses." 6
Since this section spoke only of assignments," 7 the effect of re-
cording or failing to record licenses was unclear.
Many commentators reasoned that since recordation of a li-
cense was not statutorily required, such recordation could have no
legal effect. Recordation of a license could not give constructive
notice, nor could failure to record a license affect its validity. This
analysis led to the conclusion that subsequent assignees and licen-
sees took subject to the prior license whether recorded or not." 8
The opposite result was reached by other commentators and
the few courts who considered the issue. They concluded that an
unrecorded license was void as against a subsequent transferee for
value, without notice, whose license or assignment was re-
corded. 1 9 Besides common-sense notions, 20 it appears that the
rationale for this result was based, at least in part, on the fact that
the Copyright Office would accept licenses for recordation. 121
With the statutory recognition of divisibility, the distinction be-
tween assignments and licenses disappeared in the recordation
context.122 Section 205(e) established the priorities between all
conflicting transfers of ownership.123 The transfer which is first
executed 124 prevails if it is properly 25 recorded within one month
116. Latman, supra note 99, at 765. See notes 7-8 & accompanying text supra.
117. Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 44, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
118. IL BAL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LrrERARY PROPERTY 550 (1944); A. WEILL,
supra note 8, at 562-64; Kaminstein, supra note 8, at 639; Latman, supra note
99, at 765.
119. Brady v. Reliance Motion Picture Corp., 229 F. 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1916); Photo
Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 213 F. 374,377 (S.D.N.Y.
1913), affd, 220 F. 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1915). See also Kaplan, Literary and Artis-
tic Property as Security, 19 LAw & CoNrEMP. PROB. 254, 266 (1954).
120. Judge Learned Hand concluded that "it would be absurd to protect a subse-
quent purchaser against a prior unrecorded assignee and leave him open to
prior unrecorded licenses which should defeat him." Photo Drama Motion
Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 213 F. 374, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), affd,
220 F. 448 (2d Cir. 1915).
121. The administrative practices of the Copyright Office have been relied on to
support judicial opinions. Latman, supra note 99, at 766 (citing Witwer v.
Harold Lloyd Corp., 46 F.2d 792, 795 (S.D. Cal. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 65
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 669 (1933) and Commissioner v.
Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 401 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1976), speaks in terms of "transfers of ownership" or "trans-
fers." ' ransfer of ownership" includes assignments and licenses, but spe-
cifically excludes nonexclusive licenses. Id. § 101.
123. Id. § 205(e).
124. Section 204 articulates standards for execution of transfers of copyright own-
ership. In order to be valid, a transfer of ownership must be in writing, or
otherwise noted in writing, and it must be signed by the owner of the rights
conveyed or an agent of such owner. The only exception provided occurs if
the transfer is by operation of law. Id. § 204.
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after its execution in the United States,126 or if it is properly re-
corded before the second transfer is recorded.127 If the first trans-
fer fails to meet these conditions the later transfer prevails, if it
was recorded properly and was taken for valuable consideration, in
good faith, and without notice of the earlier transfer. 28
Another unanswered question in the Copyright Act of 1909 was
whether a nonexclusive license, i.e., a permit to use the work,
which was obtained in good faith from the copyright owner of rec-
ord, was valid as against an earlier unrecorded transfer. The sta-
tus of nonexclusive licenses is resolved in section 205(f) of the
Copyright Act of 1976,129 but not without causing disagreement. A
nonexclusive license,130 whether or not it is recorded, prevails over
a conflicting transfer of ownership which is subsequently exe-
cuted. In addition, a nonexclusive license, whether recorded or
not, prevails over a conflicting transfer of ownership which is exe-
cuted, but not recorded prior to the granting of the nonexclusive
license, provided the latter was taken in good faith and without
125. To be properly recorded a document must comply with both the conditions
for recordation in section 205(a) and the conditions for recordation as con-
structive notice in section 205(c). Id. § 205(a),(c).
126. If the transfer is executed outside of the United States, the statute extends
the grace period of two months. Id. § 205(e).
The notion of a grace period during which an owner is protected, without
recordation, from subsequent transfers was part of the Copyright Act of 1909.
That Act provided for a three month grace period if the assignment was exe-
cuted in the United States and a six month period if executed elsewhere.
Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 44, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
The one and three month grace periods in the Copyright Act of 1976 were
considered to be a compromise between those who felt owners needed time
to record during which they should be protected and those who believed that
a bona fide transferee needs to be able to completely rely on the record at
any given time. H.P. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5744. Latman, supra note 99, at 772-74;
Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1034 (1965) (statement of the Copyright Committee of the Motion Pic-
ture Association of America, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Copy-
right Law Revision].
127. 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1976).
128. Id. The terms, "good faith," "valuable consideration" and "without notice"
have a similar judicial gloss in the copyright context, as in the context of con-
tracts, negotiable instruments and other areas of law. See Latman, supra
note 99, at 774-75.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 205(f) (1976).
130. In order to prevail, a nonexclusive license must be evidenced by a written
instrument signed by the owner of the right licensed or his or her agent. Id.
§ 205(f). This requirement excludes a great many nonexclusive licenses
which in practice are given orally. REPORT OF TiE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS,
supra note 53, at 95.
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notice of the transfer.13 1 Section 205(f) does not provide for a
grace period for recordation of the transfer of ownership as against
a nonexclusive license. An owner has no statutory protection
against prior nonexclusive licenses and he or she must record the
transfer document immediately to acquire protection against
nonexclusive licenses which are executed after the transfer.
The statutory treatment of nonexclusive licenses reflects the
opinion that persons who seek permission to use a work should be
entitled to rely on the record.132 The provision also reflects the
majority opinion that requiring the recordation of the great
number and variety of nonexclusive licenses would be too burden-
some and impractical.133 It was the latter opinion which sparked
debate by those concerned with allowing unrecorded nonexclusive
licenses to prevail over subsequent transfers. The persons repre-
senting this viewpoint, particularly motion picture producers, indi-
cated that in some instances outstanding nonexclusive licenses
could have a significant effect on a transfer and that transferees
should also be entitled to rely on the recording system. 34 It was
also suggested that most nonexclusive licenses would not be re-
corded, particularly if they were of little value or for a short dura-
tion, and thus the practicalities of the situation would prevent the
possible overburdening of the system. 13 The conclusion reached,
however, was that the limited advantages of requiring recordation
of nonexclusive licenses in order for them to prevail over subse-
quent conflicting transfers were outweighed by the impracticali-
ties and burdens of such a requirement. 13 6
Although the effect of the priority systems, articulated in sec-
tions 205(e)-(f) is to require only recordation of documents evi-
dencing a transfer of ownership, any other document pertaining to
a copyright may be recorded if it meets certain standards. 3 7 Fur-
ther, any document so recorded will give constructive notice of its
contents, provided it specifically identifies the particular worl' 3 8
Recording documents which reflect an interest in the copyrighted
work may be beneficial if an infringement suit is instituted. 3 9
131. 17 U.S.C. § 205(f) (1976).
132. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 53, at 97.
133. Id. at 97; H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5745.
134. Id.; PRELMINARY DRrF, supra note 39, at 306-11; Hearings on Copyright Law
Revision, supra note 126, at 1035.
135. PRELnmNARY DRAFT, supra note 39, at 307.
136. HR. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5745.
137. 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1976). See note 106 supra.
138. The work must also be registered. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1976).
139. If an infringement suit is instigated, the court may require that notice be sent
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The Copyright Act of 1976 places an increased emphasis on rec-
ordation of transfers and registration as the method for promoting
the availability of information concerning copyright ownership.
Directly related to such an emphasis is the decreased importance
of the notice requirement. 140
C. Notice
The Copyright Act of 1909 required that a notice in the name of
the copyright proprietor be affixed to each copy of a work upon
publication in order to secure copyright protection. 14 1 Although
the act provided for an exception in situations in which the notice
was accidentally omitted from a copy or copies,142 total failure to
comply with the notice provision or the affixation of an erroneous
notice resulted in a forfeiture of the copyright.143
As has been discussed, the copyright proprietor was the author
or an assignee, i.e., a transferee of all of the rights comprising the
copyright. 144 If the copyright notice affixed to the work upon pub-
lication contained the name of a licensee, the copyright would be
forfeited.14 This problem was particularly vexing in the context
of magazines or other types of compilations, since the copyright
notice was frequently in the name of the publisher who was often a
licensee.146
Those involved in the revision process generally agreed that
forfeiture of the copyright because of an error or an inadvertent
omission in the notice imposed an injustice on the unwary au-
thor.14 7 However, two schools of thought existed as to whether the
to all persons who claim an interest in the copyright as shown by the records
of the Copyright Office. Id. § 501(b).
140. Latman, supra note 99, at 776.
141. Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). The notice required included.
(1) the word "Copyright," or the abbreviation "Copr.," or the symbol "c"; (2)
the name of the copyright proprietor; (3) and in the case of literary, musical
or dramatic works, the year in which the copyright was secured by publica-
tion. Id. § 18.
142. Id. § 20.
143. Doyle, Cary, McCannon & Ringer, Notice of Copyrigh4 Study No. 7, in 1 STUD-
iEs ON CoPYRiGHTr 231, 238-46 (A. Fisher mem. ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as
Notice of Copyright]; Finkelstein, The Copyright Law-A Reappraisal, 104
W. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1054-55 & n.89 (1956).
144. See note 8 & accompanying text supra.
145. Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265 (1903); Mifflin v. R.H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260
(1903); Egner v. E.C. Schirmer Music Co., 139 F.2d 398 (1st Cir. 1943), cerL
denied, 322 U.S. 730 (1944); Public Ledger Co. v. Post Printing & Publishing
Co., 294 F. 430 (8th Cir. 1923); Public Ledger Co. v. New York Times Co., 275 F.
562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), affd, 279 F. 747 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 627
(1922); Finkelstein, supra note 143, at 1030.
146. Kaminstein, supra note 8, at 642.
147. See, e.g., HR. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 143, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
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notice provision should be modified or abrogated.14 8 Proponents of
a notice scheme argued that it fulfills an important function in in-
forming the public of the existence of a claim to copyright protec-
tion. Further, a notice provision gives the prospective user at least
an initial lead in discovering from whom permission to use the
work must be obtained. It was also suggested by proponents that,
without the requirement of an affirmative act, the majority of pub-
lished works, which fall into the public domain because no one is
interested in protecting them, would needlessly be kept in the pri-
vate domain.14 9
On the other hand, opponents argued that notice is a meaning-
less technicality. Persons who wish to determine ownership of
the copyright cannot rely on the notice provision, but must neces-
sarily look to the records in the Copyright Office. Since the author
is the intitial owner of the copyright,150 a search for permission log-
ically begins with him or her, so in most cases notice serves no
function as an initial starting point. Opponents also suggested
that automatic copyright protection, by including all works in the
private domain, would have little significant effect since works of
value to prospective users would be copyrighted in any case.
151
The notice scheme adopted in the Copyright Act of 1976 takes a
compromise approach. 52 When a work is published under the au-
thority of the copyright owner, a notice must be affixed "on all
publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually
perceived." 15 3 However, the Act includes provisions to prevent
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5759; REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra
note 53, at 63.
148. See H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 143, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5759; REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note
53, at 63; FURTHER DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON PRELMiNARY DRAFT FOR RE-
VISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PT. 4, 68-94 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter cited as FURTHER DISCUSSION AND
COMM/ENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
The contrasting viewpoints concerning the notice requirement reflect two
philosophically different attitudes toward the nature of copyright. Copyright
is perceived by some as the inherent or natural right of an author to protect
his or her creation. On the other hand, copyright is perceived as a statutory
grant to an author which can be conditioned or limited as the legislative body
chooses. See Levine & Squires, supra note 63, at 1232-33.
149. HR. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 143, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5759; REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note
53, at 62-63; Notice of Copyright, supra note 143, at 272-73.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976).
151. FURTHER DIScUSSION AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFr,supra note 148,
at 90-91; Notice of Copyrigh, supra note 143, at 272.
152. HR. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5763.
153. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976).
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forfeiture of the copyright due to omission or error in the notice in
certain circumstances if specified conditions have been met. 54
These provisions have been described as an "annuity for copyright
lawyers."' 55
Section 405 articulates three alternative circumstances under
which the omission of notice will not invalidate the copyright. 5 6
First, if the notice is omitted from a "relatively small number" of
copies distributed publicly, the omission will not result in forfei-
ture.5 7 Second, if the notice is omitted in violation of an ex-
pressed contractual requirement pursuant to the copyright
owner's authorization of the public distribution of the work, the
copyright will not be invalidated. 5 8 Third, registration of the work
within five years after publication will prevent the work from fall-
ing into the public domain. Coupled with the registration, a "1rea-
sonable effort" must be made to add notice to all copies that are
distributed after the omission has been discovered. 59 In effect, a
work published without notice will remain subject to statutory pro-
tection for at least five years. 60 However, innocent infringers who
relied on the omission of notice will not be liable for damages for
any infringing acts committed before they received actual knowl-
edge of the notice.' 6 ' The court may, however, award the copy-
right owner the profits from the use of the work and injunctive
relief or a license fee. 62
Statutory recognition of divisibility of copyright is interwoven
with section 406, which concerns errors in the copyright notice.
Under section 406, an error in the notice will not invalidate the
copyright. 63 Specifically, if the person or entity named in the
copyright notice is not the owner of the copyright, the validity of
the copyright is not affected. 164 However, statutory protection ex-
ists for the innocent infringer.'65
Divisibility of copyright permits numerous copyright owners in
one work,' 66 but the notice provisions do not specify which owner
154. See id. §§ 405, 406.
155. FURTHER DIsCUSSION AND CoMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRArt, supra note 148,
at 81.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976).
157. Id. § 405(a) (1).
158. Id. § 405(a) (3).
159. Id. § 405(a) (2).
160. HR. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG., & AD. NEWS 5763.
161. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 406.
164. Id. § 406(a).
165. Id.
166. See notes 47-49 & accompanying text supra.
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is to be named in the notice. Therefore, it seems clear that any
owner of an exclusive right, regardless of the scope or importance
of that right, may correctly insert his or her name in the notice. 167
One could argue, then, that as long as any copyright owner is
named in the notice, there is no error and the provisions of section
406(a) do not apply. The problem with this analysis arises from the
protection given by section 406 (a) to an innocent infringer. A per-
son who infringes a copyright in good faith reliance on a purported
transfer or license from the person named in the notice may be
shielded from liability in an infringement action.168 Such an inno-
cent infringer could exist in a situation in which the owner of an
exclusive right whose name appears in the notice purports to
transfer or license rights owned by a different copyright owner.
Thus the name of a copyright owner contained in the notice may
be erroneous under section 406(a) if that owner purports to trans-
fer or license rights in the copyright which he or she does not own.
Copyright owners whose rights have been purportedly trans-
ferred without their authorization may protect themselves from in-
nocent infringers. First they may be in a position to insist that the
notice also include their name.1 69 However, this is a contractual
rather than a statutory solution and, therefore, may only be of lim-
ited usefulness. Section 406(a) also offers the true owner two
methods of protecting rights in the copyright in those instances in
which someone else's name appears in the notice. 70
Section 406(a) (1) provides that a person who infringes the
copyright in good faith reliance on a license or transfer from the
person named in the notice is liable to the true owner if registra-
tion for the work has been made in the name of the copyright own-
er.17 1 It is unclear from the language of the statute whether a
basic registration filed by any owner is sufficient to invoke this ex-
ception. The basic registration may not necessarily reveal the
identity of the owner whose right in the copyright has been pur-
portedly transferred or licensed by the person named in the notice.
However, where the registration reveals that one who is not the
person named in the notice is the "copyright claimant," as defined
by regulation,172 it is likely that a prospective user would thereby
be put on notice that he or she should not rely on the name in the
copyright notice.
167. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(3) (1976).
168. Id. § 406(a).
169. Kadden, supra note 105, at 28.
170. 17 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1) (2) (1976).
171. Id. § 406(a) (1).
172. 43 Fed. Reg. 965, 966 (1978) (interim regulation, to be codified in 37 C.F.R. §
202.3(a) (3)).
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Section 406 (a) (2) provides that the innocent infringer is liable
if "a document executed by the person named in the notice and
showing the ownership of the copyright had been recorded" prior
to the infringing act.173 The scope of this exception is unclear.
However, it seems to leave the true owner unprotected in some
situations, as when the person named in the notice fails to record
the document evidencing his or her ownership. If the owner
whose rights were purportedly transferred or licensed was granted
those rights from the owner named in the notice, then protection is
apparently available by recording the document of transfer. The
document must be recorded immediately, or at least before the in-
fringing acts, as there is no statutory grace period in this con-
text. 7 4 A problem seems to arise, however, if the true owner has
acquired ownership of the copyright from one other than the per-
son named in the notice, since in this situation recordation by the
true owner will not trigger the exception of section 406(a) (2).
Rather the true owner whose rights were purportedly transferred
or licensed by the person named in the notice must rely on a recor-
dation by that person. 75
Presented with such a problem, the owner of the rights purport-
edly transferred without authority may be unable to recover from
the innocent infringer. However, this owner has a cause of action
against the owner who wrongfully transferred the right. The per-
son named in the notice must account to the true owner for all re-
ceipts from transfers or licenses purportedly granted.176 However,
the true owner may remain less than wholly compensated, either
monetarily or in the sense that he or she was forced to part with a
property right when not wishing to do so.
The provisions of section 406 are also applicable in situations
involving collective works, such as periodicals. A single notice ap-
plicable to the entire collective work is sufficient to fulfill the no-
tice requirements with respect to each individual work collected
therein.7 7 If the person named in the notice is not the owner of
the copyright in the individual work, then an error in notice has
occurred and the provisions of section 406 govern. 7 8 If the person
named in the notice has been transferred any exclusive right, such
as the exclusive right of first publication in a periodical, then that
173. 17 U.S.C. § 406(a) (2) (1976).
174. Id.
175. FURTHER DIscussIoN AND ComENTs ON PELnmNARY DRAFT, supra note 148,
at 72-79.
176. 17 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1976).
177. Id. § 404(a). Advertisements submitted on behalf of one other than the own-
er of the copyright in the collective work are exempted from this provision.
Id.
178. Id. § 404(b).
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person is a copyright owner and no error in notice has occurred.
However, if he or she purports to transfer or license rights other
than those owned under the analysis set forth above, section 406
should control.
It is clear that the notice provisions prevent or greatly reduce
the risk of inadvertent forfeiture of a copyright. The harshness
attendant upon the combination of notice as an absolute condition
of copyright and the doctrine of indivisibility has been reduced by
the Copyright Act of 1976. It is unclear, however, whether the no-
tice requirement, in any form, is compatible with divisible copy-
right. It is also unclear whether the purported benefits of a notice
scheme are worth the resulting confusion and problems.
D. Standing to Sue For Infringement
The doctrine of indivisibility was considered by courts most fre-
quently in the context of whether a particular plaintiff has stand-
ing to sue for infringement. 179 The general rule had been that only
the copyright proprietor had standing, so an exclusive licensee
could only institute an infringement suit if the proprietor was
joined.180 Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
allows the compelled joinder of a party, negated most of the
problems arising from the notion of indivisibility in this context.' 8 '
However, commentators pointed to several situations in which
the exclusive licensee could still be adversely affected because he
or she could not institute an infringement suit without joining the
copyright proprietor. An obvious problem occurred if the copy-
right proprietor had gone out of business or was otherwise unavail-
able.182 A second problem mentioned by commentators involved a
situation in which the plaintiff-exclusive licensee needed quick in-
junctive relief which could be hampered by a time-consuming join-
179. Buck v. Elm Lodge, 83 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1936); L.C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film
Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1936); Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co.,
282 F. 9 (2d Cir. 1922); Ilyin v. Avon Publications, 144 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); Field v. True Comics, 89 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Eliot v. Geare-
Marston, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 301 (EM. Pa. 1939); Witwer v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 46
F.2d 792 (S.D. Cal. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933);
Stephens v. Howells Sales Co., 16 F.2d 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); New Fiction Pub-
lishing Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
The doctrine of indivisibility was sometimes defined as solely a procedu-
ral rule. H. WARNER, supra note 5, § 53, at 130; Burton, Business Practices in
the Copyright Field, in COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS ANALYZED 87, 88 (1966).
180. 2 M. NInsER supra note 7, § 119.31, at 517 (and cases cited therein).
181. FED. R CIrv. P. 19; 2 M. NnusR , supra note 7, § 119.1, at 511; Melgrim, Territo-
riality of Copyright- An Analysis of Assignability Under the Universal Copy-
right Convention, 9 BuLu. COPYRIGHT Soc y 271, 278 (1962).
182. Appleman, supra note 24, at 624 (1939). In application FED. IL Crv. P. 19
could avoid this problem.
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der procedure. 83 From a different perspective, commentators
pointed out that the exclusive licensee could be adversely affected
by a suit instituted by the copyright proprietor of which the licen-
see had no notice. ]8 4
The primary purpose of the doctrine of indivisible copyright in
this context was to prevent multiple suits and multiple recoveries,
usually expressed from the viewpoint of protecting the defend-
ant.185 Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976186 is aimed at
achieving this goal while also protecting other parties interested in
the suit.187 With the statutory recognition of divisible copyright,
the latter goal has gained increasing importance. 88 Although an
owner who is not a party to the suit is obviously not bound by an
adverse judgment, notions of stare decisis may make recovery dif-
ficult in a second suit. A large recovery in a previous suit may also
work to the disadvantage of an owner instituting a second suit.189
Section 501(b), which articulates the standards regarding the
ability to sue and the joinder of parties, must be considered in con-
junction with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly
Rules 19 and 20. 9 Under section 501(b), the legal or beneficial
owner of an exclusive right may institute an action for the infringe-
ment of that right.191 The concept of beneficial owner clearly in-
cludes an author or assignee who is entitled to royalties from the
use of a right in a copyrighted work 92 It is less clear whether the
concept of beneficial owner would be extended to include, for ex-
ample, the beneficiary of a trust which owns an exclusive right in a
183. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 119.31, at 518; Comment, supra note 42, at 99.
184. Comment, supra note 42, at 99.
185. 2 M. NMMER, supra note 7, § 119.1, at 511. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10
How.) 477, 494-95 (1850).
186. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976).
187. HIR REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 158-59, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG., & AD. NEWS 5774-75.
188. FURTHER DIscussIoN AND CoMMsS ON PRELmNARY DRAFT, supra note 148,
at 126-28, 132-35. An infringement can adversely affect numerous different
owners of rights in one copyrightable work, as well as the claims of authors or
their transferees to royalty payments. The concern was expressed that un-
less the statutory scheme requires notice and permits intervention as a mat-
ter of right, it could be difficult for all persons with interests in the copyright
to protect their interests. Id. at 127.
189. Id. at 134-35.
190. Id. at 133-34. See also HIR REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 159, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5775.
191. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976). The right to institute a suit for infringement is con-
ditioned upon the requirements of registration and recordation of transfers.
See id. §§ 205(d), 411(a), 501(b).
192. H.R REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 159, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 5775.
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copyrighted work.193
The court may require that notice of -the suit be served upon
any person who has or claims an interest in the copyright, as re-
vealed by the records in the Copyright Office. 194 The court must
require that notice be served on any party whose interest is likely
to be affected by the outcome" of the case.195 The inducements to
register and record transfers,196 in addition to promoting the relia-
bility of the record for the purpose of determining ownership, also
avoid the overlapping of suits by increasing the likelihood of re-
ceiving notice of an instituted action.
The court has the discretion to require the joinder of any per-
son "having or claiming an interest in the copyright," but the court
must allow the intervention of such a person.197 Mandatory inter-
vention reflects the importance perceived in allowing all parties to
protect their interest in the copyright if they so desire. 198
It has been suggested that allowing any legal or beneficial own-
er of an exlusive right to institute a suit for infringement, regard-
less of the insignificance of his or her interest, may work a
hardship on the authors or owners of more important exclusive
rights in their ability to protect their interests.199 However, fed-
eral courts have dealt with such procedural problems in the con-
text of other substantive areas of law and there is little reason to
believe that the problems cannot be similarly resolved in suits in-
volving copyright infringement.
IV. CONCLUSION
In commercial practice, copyright has been divisible since tech-
nological advances increased both the number of ways to exploit a
work and the value of the rights incident to such exploitation. Ju-
dicial modifications largely rendered copyright legally divisible as
well. However, the statutory framework of the Copyright Act of
1909 was inconsistent with the realities of divisible copyright. It
seemed logical that those involved in the revision process should
strive to make the copyright law conceptually consistent with com-
mercial practice, and reject the paternalistic argument that au-
193. FURTHER DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON PREL.MINARY DRAFT, spra note 148,
at 128.
194. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976).
195. Id.
196. See §§ I-A to B of text supra.
197. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1976).
198. FURTHER DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT, Supra note 148,
at 126-27.
199. The argument posed is that the owner who initiates the infringement suit will
have the advantage of determining both where, and against whom, it is
brought. Id. at 127.
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thors and owners will splinter rights in a work to the point that it is
beyond usefulness.
Recognition that the copyright in a work may in fact be owned
by numerous entities requires an adjustment in the statutory
scheme dealing with formalities, tracing title, and standing to sue
for infringement. The provisions adopted are a compromise be-
tween creators and users, naturalists and positivists.
Statutory recognition of divisibility at the least lessens the em-
phasis on formalities as a condition of copyright. It can be argued
that divisible copyright is inconsistent with such formalities. The
notice requirement is no longer of much importance and its value,
if any, is limited to permitting some works to fall into the public
domain five years after publication.
On the other hand, divisibility requires a recording system
which is as accurate and dependable as possible without imposing
too great a. burden on owners. Thus the provisions concerning re-
gistration and recording of documents evidencing transfers are of
increased importance.
The compromise between different interest groups is evidenced
in the safeguards incident to allowing any one of the multiple legal
and beneficial owners to institute a suit for infringement. The
practical importance of permitting one who owns a valuable prop-
erty right to sue if it is damaged is tempered by the need to protect
both other owners and defendants.
This compromise legislation has apparently produced a compli-
cated but, at least superficially, effective statutory scheme which
recognizes divisibility, yet solves the problems which originally en-
gendered the need for the doctrine of indivisible copyright.
Lynne Rae Fritz '78
